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applies to thought as well as to conduct; it is matter of observed scientific fact. "To assert that, so far as man's own behavior goes he betters himself, is the same variety of judgment as to say that so far as the behavior of the population of Russia goes it increases itself."

The latter portion of the essay appears to us to contain little more than the generalizations natural to a writer of optimistic temperament. The nerve of Professor Thorndike's contribution lies in his attempt to substitute a workable physiological mechanism, an interplay of cause and effect, for the facile teleology of Spencer and his followers. That the mechanism is hypothetical is no objection; so far as our knowledge goes the nervous system may very well, as the author says, "be so constituted as to produce increasingly those neural arrangements which possess satisfyingness;" and no one can do more than guess at what really happens within it. The present guess was distinctly worth making, and might profitably be worked out in greater detail,—as, perhaps, it will be if Professor Thorndike's promised critique of Jennings evokes a reply. The doubt that remains is the doubt that lies behind his whole "interpretation of human and animal behavior;" the doubt of meliorism itself.

It is with regret that we note the omission of Professor Hyslop's name from the list of contributors to the volume. While, on formal grounds, Professor Hyslop would naturally be excluded from participation, his recent connection with Columbia University, and his sustained interest in matters of which Professor James is also a devoted student, suggest that a paper from his pen would have been especially welcome to the eminent psychologist and philosopher to whom the essays are dedicated.

P. E. WINTER.

Die biologische Theorie der Lust und Unlust, von DR. D. C. NADEJDE.
Heft I. Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1908. pp. viii, 99.

This work represents, so far as the reviewer knows, the first serious attempt to grapple critically with the teleological—or, as the writer prefers to term it, the biological—theory of pleasure-pain. Brief critical discussions may, it is true, be found in Wundt's *Physiologische Psychologie*, in Külpe's *Grundriss*, and in Ribot's *Psychologie des sentiments*; still briefer in Ziegler's *Das Gefühl* and in Stumpf's recent paper on *Gefühlsempfindungen*; and a careful search would, no doubt, add to the list. On the whole, however, the adherents of the theory, from Aristotle down to Spencer and Lehmann, have had things very much their own way. Physiological psychology has been content to remark that the rule of correlation, of pleasure with the useful and pain with the harmful, has salient exceptions, or that science may not lay too great stress upon a teleological maxim; it has made its formal reserves, and has then allowed the correlation to stand. A typical treatment of this sort is given, for example, in Ebbinghaus's *Grundzüge*. Such an attitude is no longer possible; all future students of the psychology of feeling must take account of Dr. Nadejde's work.

The work itself is, unfortunately, neither easy to read nor easy to review. The writer confesses, in the preface, to a certain difficulty in the use of German, and this difficulty may account for the somewhat cramped style, and the tendency to string together paragraphs whose logical connection is not always clear. Every one knows that the free and correct use of connectives is one of the supreme tests of a mastery of the German language; but we do not always realize how obscure a piece of otherwise straightforward reasoning may become if the connectives are omitted or their finer shades neglected. And the reviewer meets these further difficulties: that the critical portion of the essay

consists of detailed and highly articulated argument, while the constructive portion is couched in terms of Lipps's psychology, a psychology with a language and an attitude of its own. The author might have materially aided the reader by appending brief summaries to his several chapters; it is possible, however, that a general summary is to be included in the forthcoming Heft 2.

Dr. Nadejde begins by formulating the current teleological theory in two propositions: (1) that there is a connection between utility, or a normal mode and manifestation of life, and pleasure; and between harmfulness, or an abnormal mode and manifestation of life, and unpleasantness; and (2) that there is also a connection between pleasure and furtherance of life, and unpleasantness and hindrance of life. These two propositions, often confused, must for methodological reasons be sharply separated; the former concerns the maintenance, the latter the further advance or development of life. The present Heft 1 discusses the first correlation only. Its aim is threefold: to give a clear and comprehensive exposition of the theory itself; to furnish a detailed critique, from a strictly psychological point of view; and, finally, to reconstruct the theory in unexceptionable form.

We begin, then, with exposition, which naturally starts out from and closely follows Herbert Spencer, although other psychologists are duly referred to. Two points are of especial importance in this chapter. (1) The author brings clearly to light the twofold character of the pleasure-pain correlation. On the one hand, the feelings are regarded as symptomatic; they are signs, indications of a normal or abnormal life-mode. On the other hand, however, they have an active function; they are incentives to and deterrents from action, they guide the vital functions, they stimulate activity for ends. As symptomatic, they refer back to their cause (bodily function); as active, they refer forwards to their consequence (mental and bodily activity); there is interaction between environed organism and pleasure-pain. (2) The arguments offered in support of the theory are of two kinds: inductive and deductive. Greater emphasis is usually laid (as by Spencer) upon the deductive arguments. And these are again twofold; direct and indirect. The direct argument asserts that the biological theory is "an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution" (Spencer); the indirect argument seeks to prove the theory by proving the inconceivability of its opposite.

The author's criticism begins with a refutation of this second, indirect proof. The refutation is flat and final. The indirect argument is guilty of two logical errors; it presupposes the very thing that is to be demonstrated, namely, the identity of utility and pleasure, harmfulness and pain; and it mistakes the meaning and nature of the law of causation. You cannot alter cause without thereby altering effect; and the existence of an "objektive Bedingung" necessarily implies the non-existence of its opposite. "It is nonsense to try to demonstrate the impossibility of the opposite of an objective condition by showing its incompatibility with other conditions; for the impossibility of the opposite is already given in its direct contradiction of actual fact, *i. e.*, of the objective condition whose opposite it is." Thus far, then, the ground is cleared.

We pass, next, to a critique of the concept of utility. This is, evidently, a concept of relation,—a *Beziehungsbegriff*, not an *Anschauungsbegriff*. So the question arises: What is the connection or relation upon which utility is dependent, or by which it is conditioned? Or, more briefly: What is the cause of the useful? When the biological theory answers this question directly, it declares: the useful is that which satisfies the needs of life, conditions the equilibrium of the

organism, etc. But such a reply is logically faulty; it explains the concepts of adaptation, normal functioning, etc., but not the concept of utility. When, on the other hand, concrete instances of the useful are given, they always take the form of certain physical conditions of life: oxygen, water, heat, nutrition, etc. And here there is a double confusion. First, the useful is identified with one set of the conditions of our physical life, and with one set only, namely, the external, environmental factors; the influence of the inner conditions, of organized substance, is left out of account. And what holds of the useful holds here also, of course, of pleasure-pain. Secondly, however, since the theory has overlooked the duality of life-conditions and has identified the useful with these conditions at large, the causal connection becomes for it not the connection of utility and pleasure, but that of physical life-conditions and pleasure. All that we have to do, then, is to strip the concept of its borrowed robes, to remember that it is the concept not of 'cause' but of 'utility,' and we see that it represents simply a subjectively conditioned judgment, of the sort with which science can have nothing to do. The concept of utility must be eliminated.

The two following chapters are occupied with the factual exceptions to the rule of correlation, and with the various attempts made to defend the theory in spite of these contradictory instances. The proposed limitations of the teleological interpretation—local, qualitative, temporal—are shown to be of no avail; and Spencer's recourse to an extension of the theory, in terms of an ethics of optimism, brings him into contradiction with his own evolutionist principles. Once more, therefore, the theory fails to meet the demands of logic. What is left of it?

We must attempt a reconstruction, bearing in mind the two cardinal errors of the biologists: the introduction of the concept of utility, with the view of discovering in the theory of feeling a basis for preconceived ethical views; and the confusion or identification of physical conditions with mental phenomena. We may say, in psychological terms, that pleasure is the expression of the direct fulfillment of the conditions, tendencies or needs of the psyche; and that unpleasantness is the expression of an imperilled or indirect fulfillment of these same conditions, etc. The symptomatic significance of the feelings is thus retained. Their active significance must be given up. For the conception of pleasure as incentive or stimulus involves the confusion, first, of feeling with active endeavor (wish, inclination), and secondly of active endeavor with movement, activity, will, *i. e.*, with the actualization of endeavor for the attainment of an end. The uniform connection between pleasure and endeavor rather finds its explanation in the law that all psychical occurrence follows the line of the easier, less resistant, and therefore free and direct realization of its natural tendencies. Pleasure is thus, in other words, an indication that the natural intrinsic tendency of mental occurrence may continue its course unimpeded by the tendency of the object which confronts consciousness; unpleasantness is an indication that the tendency of the external object impedes, inhibits, checks, obstructs this intrinsic natural tendency. Pleasure and pain are neither stimulus nor end, but symptom and symptom only.

These general remarks must now be supplemented by special considerations. First, what of the utility of pain? On the biological theory, pain must be useful, or it could not have 'survived.' Now it is not as symptom of organic damage, but rather as incentive to the avoiding reaction, that pain can be of service. And as we have seen that the active rôle attributed to the feelings depends upon a confusion

of thought, we might dismiss our question without further answer. If, however, we seek for a positive rebuttal, we find facts enough at our disposal. Unpleasant experience may be avoided not only by action but also by inaction; and the 'avoiding' reaction itself may be of two kinds, withdrawal or attack and conquest; and, yet again, unpleasant experience may be overcome, and thus in effect avoided, by habit. Moreover, the unpleasant may have to be sought, as means to a remoter end. And finally there is case upon case of inevitable pain (incurable disease), of pain whose avoidance is impossible. The biological theory breaks down.

What, secondly, of the pathological character of unpleasurable feeling? Is such feeling always a symptom of organic lack or damage? The author argues the question to a negative result in what is, to the reviewer's mind, one of the best reasoned chapters of his study. He takes up, in order, the topics of bodily discomfort (here he befalls the issue, to some extent, by a confusion of pain as feeling with pain as sensation) and of emotional or 'moral' pains and disagreeableness. Under the latter heading he points out, *e. g.*, that in the course of an hour's reading one may have had an almost unbroken succession of disagreements, aversions, irritations; vital disturbance, cerebral damage must, then, occur every minute or two! Moreover, it cannot be affirmed, on the other side, that pleasure means always an enhancement of life; there are pleasures from chronic indulgence, pleasures of insanity, the euphoria of the death-bed. It must, therefore, be concluded that pleasure and pain are both alike normal phenomena, and that both swing within wide limits of intensive difference.

With these special considerations out of the way, we can proceed to a final formulation. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are qualitative opposites, normal and positive experiences. Pleasantness is the symptom or index of the fact that a mental process is suited for mental assimilation; unpleasantness, on the other hand, signifies that a mental process is unsuited for mental assimilation. This conclusion is wrought out in terms of Lipps's two "fundamental conditions of the psychical life," *Vereinheitlichung* and *Sonderung*. —

It is unfortunately inevitable that an ordered presentation of any psychological doctrine must, as things are, be couched in the language of some particular psychological system. The present writer is unable, on many fundamental points, to agree with Lipps. Hence it is but natural that the constructive part of the essay whose contents have been here outlined should seem to him less successful than its critical sections. It must, however, be said that a translation of the author's position into other terms is easily possible. As criticism, the essay is very certainly deserving of high praise. Dr. Nadejde has attacked an obvious and important problem which has been neglected, or at least but very partially treated, by his contemporaries. He has thus done a real service to scientific psychology. Such problems are, of course, not to be solved out of hand, and there will, without doubt, be reply and counter-reply and reply again. But, at any rate, a shrewd blow has been struck at the teleological interpretation of the feelings.

E. DANBY.

Philosophie der Werte: Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung, von HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1908. pp. viii, 486.

It was in 1808, exactly a century ago, that Johann Gottlieb Fichte issued his "Reden an die deutsche Nation." The tremendous influence of this work is well known. As Professor Münsterberg puts it, Fichte's "Weltanschauung war ein künstliches Denkgebilde, aber wieder bewährte es sich, dass der Idealismus des abstrakten Denkers